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Abstract 
 
Algorithmic trading has reshaped equity markets 
and had significant effects on market performance. We 
examine the effect of algorithmic trading in online 
peer-to-peer lending markets. These markets were 
originally designed to be accessible to individual 
investors, however, because algorithmic trading is 
typically used by institutional investors with 
substantial resources, algorithmic trading threatens to 
shut individual investors out of the market. Ironically, 
this could exacerbate inequalities in the financial 
system that peer-to-peer lending markets were 
designed to help eliminate. To study the effects of 
algorithmic trading, we examine an API upgrade on 
Prosper.com that facilitated algorithmic trading. 
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that 
individual “manual” investors were crowded out of 
the most quickly-funded and typically best-performing 
loans after the API upgrade. However, the API 
upgrade may have increased the size of the market, 
thereby allowing individual investors to continue 
investing in the market, albeit for somewhat lower 
quality loans.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Decisions that were previously made by humans 
are increasingly being made by information systems. 
One example is algorithmic trading, which we 
examine in this study. Algorithmic trading, which can 
be loosely defined as “the use of computer systems to 
execute trading strategies” [1], has reshaped equity 
markets and had significant implications for market 
performance [2]. Algorithmic trading also raises 
questions about fairness, given that some market 
participants do not have the expertise or sophistication 
to use the technology. This may create an uneven 
playing field in which sophisticated investors who 
engage in algorithmic trading crowd out 
unsophisticated investors who do not. 
We investigate the implications of algorithmic 
trading in the context of peer-to-peer lending. In peer-
to-peer lending, borrowers seeking loans create 
listings on web sites such as Prosper.com and 
LendingClub. Investors choose which of these 
borrowers to fund based on these listings. If a 
borrower’s listing attracts enough investors, then s/he 
can receive the loan. In this context, we use the term 
“algorithmic trading” to refer to the practices of 
automated and data-driven decision making enabled 
by API. Peer-to-peer lending is an interesting context 
for our analysis for two reasons. First, as reflected by 
the “peer-to-peer” label, online lending markets were 
originally designed to connect individual (and 
presumably non-sophisticated) investors with 
borrowers. The original model was that these 
individual investors would access the web site 
manually to review listings and identify which of their 
“peers” they wanted to lend to. This model is changing 
as institutional investors fund an increasing percentage 
of online loans, largely via algorithms that select the 
loans automatically (and very quickly). This threatens 
to upend the traditional model upon which online 
lending originally flourished. Second, this context 
allows us to extend prior research on the effects of 
algorithmic trading. In most contexts in which 
algorithmic trading has been studied (e.g., the stock 
market), the same assets (e.g., stocks) may be bought 
and sold multiple times. This means that there are 
always opportunities for non-sophisticated investors 
to purchase or sell assets. This is not true of online 
loans. Once these loans are funded by an investor(s), 
they are no longer available to other investors. Thus, it 
is possible that algorithmic trading could allow 
sophisticated investors to capture the entire online 
lending market. Further, the ultimate impact of 
algorithmic trading in these markets is unclear. 
“Manual” investors argue that they are crowded out of 
the market because they cannot match the speed 
advantage of the algorithmic investors. Algorithmic 
investors argue that the algorithms help satisfy 
borrowers’ needs more quickly and efficiently, which 
leads to market growth and more opportunity for all 
investors, including manual investors.  
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We use data from Prosper.com to study the effects 
of algorithmic trading. Because we cannot directly 
observe which investors use algorithmic trading 
technologies, we study the effect of a policy change 
that facilitated algorithmic trading. On March 11, 
2013, Prosper.com released a major upgrade to its API 
(Application Programming Interface). The new API 
made it easier to algorithmically select loans to fund 
by providing more data fields and improving response 
time. If the API helped institutional investors “crowd 
out” manual investors via algorithmic trading 
strategies, then we should see the followings after the 
release of the new API: high-quality loans being 
funded very quickly (too quickly to be funded 
manually) and by a relatively small number of 
investors who loan large amounts. Using a difference-
in-differences strategy, we find precisely that. This 
suggests that manual investors are being “crowded” 
out of the market by algorithmic trading. However, 
there is some evidence that algorithmic trading has led 
to market growth, such that opportunities remain for 
manual investors, although these are typically for 
lower quality loans as measured by default risk and 
yield. 
 
2. Literature review and theoretical 
foundation  
2.1. Investor decision making in online peer-
to-peer lending markets 
 
Manual investors tend to rely on both traditional 
financial information and “soft” information to make 
investment decisions [3]. In addition to traditional 
financial information, the decision making process is 
influenced (and biased sometimes) by several factors, 
including peer decisions, borrowers’ friendship 
networks, loan descriptions, geographical distance, 
cultural distance, political distance, and borrowers’ 
appearance, gender, and race [4-15]. Some recent 
studies distinguish sophisticated investors from 
manual investors and find that they rely on different 
information to screen loans or projects, but their 
investing performance is not necessarily different [16-
18]. Although there is some evidence that 
sophisticated investors might evaluate borrowers 
differently, it is unclear how this difference affects 
market opportunities for different types of investors. 
 
2.2. Algorithmic trading in equity markets 
 
Algorithmic trading refers to “the use of computer 
systems to execute trading strategies” [1] or “any form 
of trading using sophisticated algorithms 
(programmed systems) to automate all or some part of 
the trade cycle” [19]. Algorithmic traders may be both 
faster-acting and better-informed than manual traders 
[2]. Algorithmic traders can act faster because their 
trades are executed automatically based on decision 
rules, and they may be better informed because trades 
are based on statistical models fed by rich market data. 
Algorithmic trading improves price efficiency, 
reduces price discovery and information acquisition, 
and increases market liquidity [1, 20]. These findings 
stem largely from stock markets where algorithmic 
investors can provide liquidity by buying and selling 
stocks without necessarily eliminating opportunities 
for manual investors to also buy and sell. However, it 
is unclear what the impact of algorithmic trading 
would be in a market where algorithmic investors 
compete with manual investors for a fixed set of assets, 
such as for loans in the peer-to-peer lending context. 
Accordingly, we investigate the implications of 
algorithmic trading on an understudied outcome, i.e. 
investors’ participation. 
 
2.3. How Algorithmic trading might influence 
investor participation 
 
The basic components of algorithmic trading are 
automation and information [2]. The automation 
component means that most or all of the trade is 
executed by automated systems and technologies. In 
the context of online lending, automation enables 
investors to automate their investment decisions rather 
than manually logging into the platform, picking 
loans, and placing orders. Therefore, automation 
should speed up funding time, which becomes our first 
hypothesis (H1): algorithmic trading can decrease loan 
funding time. The information component means that 
investors use models/algorithms to analyze 
information to evaluate and select borrowers. Because 
it is widely expected that data-driven statistical models 
can improve decision efficiency and accuracy, we 
hypothesize that algorithmic trading can improve 
investment performance, i.e. the performance of loans 
selected by algorithms should be higher (H2). 
Combining H1 and H2, it is reasonable to expect that 
manual investors would be crowded out of the best, 
most quickly-funded loans. We thus propose the third 
hypothesis (H3): algorithmic trading decreases the 
number of investors of “flash” loans, which we use to 
denote the top 20% of loans in terms of funding time, 
from fastest to slowest. 
Besides a direct impact, algorithmic trading might 
also indirectly influence the whole market. This might 
occur if algorithmic trading decreases funding time 
and increases decision efficiency. Decreased funding 
time might retain/attract more borrowers to online 
lending platforms. Increased decision efficiency 
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(either real or perceived) might increase investors’ 
confidence and motivate them to fund more 
borrowers, especially those risky borrowers in whom 
they otherwise won’t invest. These two effects could 
lead to a larger market size, which is our fourth 
hypothesis (H4). Because H3 suggests less investor 
participation while H4 suggests more, there is no prior 
theoretical expectation for the overall impact of 
algorithmic trading on investor participation. 
Therefore, we propose our final hypothesis in a non-
directional way, saying algorithmic trading might 
either increase or decrease investor participation (H5). 
Table 1 summarizes these five hypotheses. 
 
Table 1. Research hypotheses 
H1 Algorithmic trading reduces loan funding time. 
H2 Algorithmic trading increases lending performance. 
H3 Algorithmic trading reduces number of investors.  
H4 Algorithmic trading increases market size. 
H5 Algorithmic trading increases or decreases the 
overall investor participation.  
  
3. Empirical setting and data  
3.1. Empirical setting 
 
The focal online lending platform that we study is 
Prosper.com. Prosper.com operates in the following 
way (since 2011): (1) borrowers submit their loan 
requests and personal financial information to 
Prosper.com; (2) Prosper.com underwrites the 
requests (to set the interest rate) and posts the loan 
requests (i.e., “listings”); (3) investors choose which 
borrowers to fund and how much to fund; and (4) 
borrowers receive their loans if they attract enough 
investment (either 70% or 100% of the requested 
amount, depending on borrower’s choice). Initially, 
step 3 was conducted manually by investors. 
Currently, much of step 3 is conducted via algorithmic 
trading in which sophisticated investors use data 
provided by Prosper.com (perhaps combined with 
other data) to automatically select and fund loans. 
 
3.2. Data and variables  
 
We gathered a dataset of 63,706 loans funded 
through Prosper.com from 2011 to 2013. We created 
several variables to describe each loan. Funding time 
is the difference between when the loan was first 
posted and when it was funded. We created two 
measures of investor concentration per loan: Number 
of investors is the number of investors per loan, and 
average funding amount is the average amount that 
each investor invested in the loan. We measured each 
loan’s performance via compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) and internal rate of return (IRR) as well as 
whether the borrower defaulted on the loan (default 
status). We use the following as control variables: loan 
interest rate, amount borrowed, monthly payment, and 
several variables about the borrower, including 
monthly income, debt-to-income ratio (including the 
loan), months employed, number of credit inquires in 
the last 6 months, and open credit lines. Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics of this dataset.   
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Loan Funding Variables 
Funding time (in hours) 48.48 80.92 
Funding time (in logged seconds) 8.55 4.06 
Number of investors 66.66 90.06 
Average funding amount per 
investor 
3,227.27 5,902.76 
Amount borrowed 9,045.99 6,147.36 
Interest rate 0.202 0.072 
Loan Performance Variables 
Compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) 
0.023 0.141 
Internal rate of return (IRR) 0.050 0.185 
Default status 0.204 0.403 
Loan Credit Variables 
FICO score 697 38.751 
Monthly payment (in $1,000) 0.294 0.183 
Borrower stated monthly income 
(in $1,000) 
5.921 9.161 
Debt-to-income ratio 0.401 0.512 
Months employed 104.433 97.415 
Inquires in last 6 months 0.981 1.427 
Open credit lines 9.426 4.912 
Notes: This dataset contains 63,706 loans that are (1) 
eventually issued and (2) listed on Prosper platform from 
2011 to 2013. Debt-to-income ratio is capped at 2. 
 
We also gathered a complementary dataset of all 
listings that appeared on Prosper.com during the same 
period. Not all listings become funded loans. Listings 
may expire (if a listing fails to pass the funding 
threshold), be canceled by Prosper.com (if a listing is 
incomplete or contains incorrect information), or be 
withdrawn (if the borrower withdraws the loan 
application due to personal reasons). This dataset 
allows us examine changes in the size of the market.  
 
4. Empirical strategy, analysis, and 
results 
 
Because we cannot directly observe investors’ use 
of algorithmic trading technologies, we study the 
effect of a major upgrade to Prosper’s API on March 
11, 2013 that facilitated algorithmic trading.  This 
upgrade yielded three key improvements. First, the 
data structure exposed by the API became more user-
friendly, such that investors could use the API more 
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easily. In addition, the API became faster and more 
responsive. Second, approximately 460 new data 
elements were made available through the API, 
thereby permitting more sophisticated loan-selection 
models. Third, the API allowed investors to use third-
party tools, thereby providing more options for 
investors to use API. 
 
4.1. Model free evidence  
 
We first investigated the funding time of loans 
across time. We classified funded loans into three 
categories based on how fast they got funded: top 20% 
(“flash” loans), the middle 60%, and the bottom 20% 
(“leftover” loans). Panels A, B, and C of Figure 1 show 
the median funding time of each group day by day 
from January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013 (because the 
whole lone program was launched April 2013 so we 
excluded observations after March 31 to avoid 
confounding effects). A notable pattern is that funding 
time of “flash” loans drops significantly after the new 
API was released on March 11, but the funding time 
of “leftover” loans is almost unchanged. Panel D of 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of loans that get funded 
within 60 seconds, 10 minutes, and 1 hour across time. 
By the end of March 2013, about 10% of loans are 
funded in 60 seconds and 30% of loans are funded in 
10 minutes. This suggests that these loans are being 
funded algorithmically, given that manual investors 
are unlikely to be able to fund loans this quickly.   
 
 
Figure 1. Funding time by group across time 
 
We next investigated investor concentration in 
loans over time. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the median 
number of investors per loan of each group from 
January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013 while Panels B, C, 
and D of Figure 2 show the median average funding 
amount per investor per loan. After the new API was 
released on March 11, fewer investors share in “flash” 
loans or in the middle 60% of loans. This suggests that 
these loans are being funded by institutional investors 
who provide a larger portion of the loan fund. 
 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 
 
To better identify the effect of the API upgrade, 
we use a difference-in-differences strategy, which is 
widely used in studies about platform implementation, 
policy change or technology change [21-23]. As 
shown in the model-free analysis, the “leftover” loans 
(i.e., those funded last) were largely unaffected by the 
API upgrade. We believe that this is because these 
loans are typically funded by manual investors who 
are not influenced by the API upgrade (because they 
don’t use the API). Thus, we use “leftover” loans as 
the control group. Conversely, the “flash” loans appear 
to be affected by the API upgrade, and we consider 
them to be the treated group. The difference-in-
differences approach allows us to separate the effect of 
any general supply or demand shock or macro-
economic trend (which should affect both “flash” and 
“leftover” loans) from the effect of the API upgrade 
(which should not affect “leftover” loans). We use the 
middle 60% of loans as a secondary treatment group. 
Including them allows us to check the proposed 
mechanism, because we expect them to be affected in 
the same direction as the “flash” loans but with a 
smaller magnitude. It is worth noting that the 
“leftover” loans don’t serve as a strict control group 
because they are also influenced by the API upgrade. 
If we assume the impacts of the API upgrade have the 
same direction on all three groups, we actually 
underestimate the impact of API upgrade by viewing 
“leftover” loans as the control group.   
 
 
Figure 2. Funding time and investor concentration 
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To avoid conflating our analysis with other policy 
changes made by Prosper.com, we restricted our 
analysis to the days close to the March 11, 2013 
treatment date. At the month level, we define February 
2013 as the pre-treatment period while March 2013 as 
the post-treatment period. We only show analysis 
results at the month level, but our findings are also 
robust at day level. Flash (i.e. top 20%), middle 60%, 
and leftover (i.e. bottom 20%) are defined based on 
funding time ranking within each month. The basic 
DID model is shown in specification (1). 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖          (1)  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  indicates the outcome variables including 
funding time, number of investors, average funding 
amount per investor and loan performance measures 
such as CAGR, IRR, and default. Due to the skewed 
distribution and the between-group variation of 
funding time, number of investors, and average 
funding amount per investor, we use the natural log of 
each as the dependent variable. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  indicates 
whether loan i belongs to the top 20% in terms of 
funding time (“flash” loans), the middle 60%, or the 
bottom 20% (“leftover” loans). When estimating the 
model, we use the “leftover” loans as the baseline 
group. 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is defined as 1 if a loan was 
listed after the treatment and 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
interaction of  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
controls for other factors that might influence the 
dependent variables (see Table2).  Time fixed effects 
are not included because they are collinear with 
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 in the monthly analysis. 
Specification (1) is designed to test hypotheses 1 
to 3, which are about the direct impacts of algorithmic 
trading on loan outcomes. We test hypothesis 4 via 
conditional correlations rather than a DID model, 
given that we lack a control group.  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +
𝛾𝛾2𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                             (2) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an indicator of listing success, measured as 
whether the listing passes the funding threshold 
(passing funding threshold) and the actual funding 
percentage (funding percentage). This model simply 
tests whether listings are more likely to become loans 
after the API upgrade. This allows us to test whether 
the API upgrade increases the number of available 
loans, thereby increasing the market size. We consider 
alternative explanations for market growth (e.g., 
increased number of investors) via robustness checks. 
We find that the API upgrade also changes the “taste” 
of investors, which is not likely to be a consequence of 
increased investor money (details not included due to 
space limitations).  
        Although we don’t observe a direct transfer from 
manual lending to algorithmic trading, the API 
upgrade can fairly represent this situation because 
before the API upgrade few investors were using the 
API so the general environment was close enough to 
manual lending.  
 
4.3. Main results  
 
The results of our tests of H1 to H3 are shown in 
Tables 3 and 4. They are estimated based on 
specification (1) and support H1. Column 1 of Table 3 
show that after the API upgrade, “flash” loans get 
funded much faster. The coefficient for the “flash” 
loan group after the API treatment is -3.179 and 
significant. This reduces the funding time of “flash” 
loans by 95.8% ( e−3.179 -1); the corresponding 
reduction for middle 60% loans is 62.7% (e−0.985-1). 
Considering the mean funding time for “flash” loans 
is 4,032 seconds pre-treatment, the effect amounts to 
eliminating 3,862 seconds.  
 
Table 3. DID analysis on funding time and 
investor concentration 
Outcome 
Variable 
Log 
(Funding 
Time in 
Seconds) 
Log 
(Number of 
Investors) 
Log 
(Average 
Funding 
Amount)  
Post treatment -0.303
*** 
(0.037) 
0.012 
(0.031) 
0.000 
(0.036) 
Loan group: Flash 
loans 
-5.016*** 
(0.110) 
-1.501*** 
(0.075) 
1.399*** 
(0.077) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60% 
-1.557*** 
(0.056) 
-0.348*** 
(0.039) 
0.350*** 
(0.041) 
Loan group: Flash 
loans * post 
treatment 
-3.179*** 
(0.114) 
-2.760*** 
(0.089) 
2.835*** 
(0.093) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60% * 
post treatment 
-0.985*** 
(0.077) 
-0.418*** 
(0.045) 
0.394*** 
(0.047) 
Control variables √ √ √ 
Loan term fixed 
effects 
√ √ √ 
Loan grade fixed 
effects √ √ √ 
# of observations 2,581 2,581 2,581 
R2 0.8109 0.8049 0.8045 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
H3 is also supported. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 
show that after the API upgrade, both “flash” loans and 
middle 60% loans have fewer investors and a larger 
average funding amount per investor. For “flash” 
loans, the number of investors decreases by 93.7% 
( e−2.760 -1) and the average funding amount per 
investor increases by 1603% (e2.835-1). Considering 
the mean number of investors is 40 pre-treatment, the 
decrease implies that approximately 37 investors are 
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crowded out of “flash” loans after the API upgrade. 
Middle 60% loans also experience a 34.2% decrease 
in number of investors and a 48.3% increase in average 
funding amount per investor. 
Table 4 shows the results of our tests of H2. 
Because algorithmic investors might have different 
loan preferences than manual investors (e.g. 
algorithmic investors might invest in only loans of 
grade C, D, E, and HR while manual investors might 
invest in only loans of grade AA, A, B, C, and D), we 
test H2 by examining both absolute performance and 
within loan grade performance (but we only show 
results on absolute performance analysis due to space 
limitation). We find weak to no evidence for H2. The 
API upgrade doesn’t significantly affect the 
performance difference between “flash” loans and 
“leftover” loans. As shown below, this is likely 
because “flash” loans have always outperformed 
“leftover” loans: the API upgrade did not increase this 
performance gap. 
 
Table 4. DID analysis on lending performance 
Outcome 
Variable CAGR IRR Default  
Post treatment -0.006 (0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.036) 
Loan group: 
Flash loans 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.021 
(0.038) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60% 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.028 
(0.032) 
Loan group: 
Flash loans * 
post treatment 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.065 
(0.049) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60% * 
post treatment 
0.018a 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
(0.016) 
-0.028 
(0.041) 
Loan term 
fixed effects 
  √ 
Loan grade 
fixed effects   √ 
# of 
observations 2,626 2,626 2,626 
R2 0.0029 0.0032 0.0504 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. a p value=0.119. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of our tests of H4, which 
were estimated from specification (2). This analysis is 
based on the listing dataset rather than the loan dataset 
used for testing H1 to H3. The coefficients for Post 
treatment are always positive and significant, 
indicating that after the API upgrade more loans are 
funded. Considering the pre-treatment means of 
funding percentage and passing funding threshold are 
0.871 and 0.847, the 0.029 coefficient in column 1 
represents a 3.3% increase in funding percentage 
while the 0.034 coefficient in column 2 represents a 
4.0% increase in funding likelihood. This suggests that 
the API upgrade corresponds to an increase in market 
size. It is possible that other events that occurred at a 
similar time as the API upgrade might explain this 
finding. However, the relatively narrow time window 
that we use helps to make this less likely.  
 
Table 5. Before/after treatment analysis on 
funding percentage 
Outcome Variable Funding Percentage 
Passing Funding 
Threshold 
Post treatment 0.029
*** 
(0.009) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
Control Variables √ √ 
Loan Term Fixed 
Effects 
√ √ 
Loan Grade Fixed 
Effects √ √ 
# of observations 4,248 4,248 
R2 0.0206 0.0311 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
       The main results can be explained by two 
channels that are brought by API upgrade, which are 
automated decision making and data-driven decision 
making. Automated decision making is likely 
contributing to reduced funding time while data-
driven decision making is likely contributing to 
increased lending performance. It is hard to say to 
what extent each of them contributes to the results and 
whether only a combination of them can lead to all the 
observed results. This is an open question for future 
research. 
 
4.4. Robustness checks and additional analysis  
 
The previous results suggest that algorithmic 
trading reduces loan funding time, increases investor 
concentration, and increases the market size. Although 
the DID design can rule out the influence of trends that 
affect all loan groups equally, it is still possible that 
there are some confounding events that influence these 
groups differently. One major concern is the inflow of 
large amounts of investor money, which might yield 
similar results as those that we find. To rule out this 
alternative explanation, we analyzed one event in 
which large amount of investor money became 
available in the market. In May 2011, a large 
institutional investor made a $150 million investment 
commitment to Prosper. We viewed this events as a 
treatment that affected the Prosper investment pool 
and replicated our DID analysis using the months 
around this treatment. The results in Table 6 indicate 
that the treatment effects are similar to those that 
reported in Table 3. However, the magnitude is far 
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smaller: for “flash” loans, there is no significant 
change in funding time, a 15.0% decrease in number 
of investors, and a 17.6% increase in average funding 
amount per investor. The corresponding magnitudes 
from Table 3 are 95.8%, 93.7%, and 1603%. 
Therefore, even if the API upgrade happened to 
coincide with a huge inflow of investor money, our 
effect is unlikely to be explained solely by the inflow 
of investor money. 
 
Table 6. Impacts of the inflow of large amounts of 
investor money 
Outcome 
Variable 
Log 
(Funding 
Time in 
Seconds) 
Log 
(Number of 
Investors) 
Log 
(Average 
Funding 
Amount)  
Post treatment -0.012 (0.023) 
-0.127*** 
(0.028) 
0.125*** 
(0.028) 
Loan group: Flash 
loans 
-3.415*** 
(0.108) 
-1.008*** 
(0.056) 
0.884*** 
(0.056) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60% 
-0.589*** 
(0.027) 
-0.358*** 
(0.025) 
0.345*** 
(0.024) 
Loan group: Flash 
loans * post 
treatment 
0.021 
(0.141) 
-0.163** 
(0.072) 
0.162** 
(0.072) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60% * 
post treatment 
-0.092*** 
(0.035) 
-0.119*** 
(0.035) 
0.099*** 
(0.035) 
Control variables √ √ √ 
Loan term fixed 
effects 
√ √ √ 
Loan grade fixed 
effects √ √ √ 
# of observations 2,818 2,818 2,818 
R2 0.7034 0.6546 0.3485 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. This analysis is 
conducted at monthly level.  
 
Regarding investment performance, we find no 
support that algorithmic trading improves investment 
performance. To explore this, we conducted an 
additional analysis. It is possible that “flash” loans 
have always outperformed “leftover” loans, and this 
performance difference is not enlarged by the API 
upgrade. In Table 7 we simply compare the 
performance of “flash” loans, middle 60% loans, and 
“leftover” loans in the year 2013. “Flash” loans (as 
well as middle 60% loans) outperform “leftover” 
loans: they have a 26.8% (0.009/0.038) advantage in 
CAGR, a 23.1% (0.015/0.065) advantage in IRR, and 
an 11.1% (0.028/0.252) advantage in default rate (i.e. 
lower default rate). When funding time is used as the 
key independent variable, the results are the same 
(unreported but available upon request): slower 
funding time predicts poorer performance. Given these 
findings, we conclude that the API upgrade doesn’t 
bring in an additional performance advantage for 
“flash” loans compared to “leftover” loans (at least not 
in the short term around the API upgrade). 
 
Table 7. Funding time, algorithmic trading, and 
lending performance 
Outcome 
Variable CAGR IRR Default  
Loan group: 
Flash loans 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.028** 
(0.010) 
Loan group: 
Middle 60%  
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
Constant 0.038
*** 
(0.001) 
0.065*** 
(0.001) 
0.252*** 
(0.018) 
Loan grade fixed 
effects   √ 
Time fixed 
effects √ √ √ 
# of observations 20,183 20,183 20,183 
R2 0.0034 0.0051 0.0355 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at month level. All models don’t 
include credit information (to check absolute performance).  
 
4.5. Implications for investor participation  
 
Our results indicate that algorithmic trading 
crowds out manual investors from “flash” loans and 
middle 60% loans but also increases the market size. 
Thus, it is not clear whether the absolute number of 
loans available to manual investors increases or 
decreases. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the total 
investment amount from manual investors. Instead, we 
create two proxy indicators for “crowd” loans, i.e., 
loans funded by manual investors. In the first 
approach, we define a loan as a “crowd” loan when the 
average funding amount per investor is less than $100. 
We then count both the number of “crowd” loans and 
the percentage of “crowd” loans per day before and 
after the API upgrade. Panel A of Figure 3 shows the 
result. The second approach (the results of which are 
shown in Panel B of Figure 3) is similar, except that 
we define a loan as a “crowd” loan if the number of 
investors exceeds 100. With both measures, the 
number of “crowd” loans increases after the API 
upgrade, but the percentage of “crowd” loans 
decreases. This suggests that even though manual 
investors are being crowded out of some loans, market 
growth allows them to continue to invest in the market. 
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Panel A: “Crowd” loans under definition 1              
 
Panel B: “Crowd” loans under definition 2 
Figure 3. Total number and share of “crowd” loans 
 
Although the quantity of loans available to manual 
investors may not suffer from algorithmic trading, the 
quality of loans might suffer. Because manual 
investors are crowded out of “flash” loans and middle 
60% loans, and because “flash” loans and middle 60% 
loans always outperform “leftover” loans, it is 
reasonable to expect that loans available to manual 
investors are inferior. We test this directly in Table 8 
and Table 9. In Table 8, the number of investors is the 
key independent variable while in Table 9 the crowd 
loan dummy variable (using definition 1 from above) 
is the key independent variable. Under both 
approaches the “crowd” loans available to manual 
investors almost always perform worse than loans 
funded by fewer investors. Based on the results in 
column 2 in Table 8, compared with a loan funded by 
1 investor, a loan funded by 101 investors has a lower 
IRR with a 0.008 (0.00008*100) rate difference, 
indicating a 14.5% (0.008/0.055) performance decline. 
Column 2 in Table 9 shows a similar result, implying 
a 19.2% (0.01/0.052) performance decline. In 
addition, “crowd” loans experience an additional 
performance decline after the API upgrade, although 
the decline is not always significant.  
 
Table 8. Performance of “crowd” loans (number 
of investor as key independent variable   ) 
Outcome Variable CAGR IRR Default  
Post treatment 0.004
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.041*** 
(0.005) 
Number of investor -0.00002
* 
(0.00001) 
-0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
Number of investor 
* post treatment 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.038
*** 
(0.001) 
0.065*** 
(0.001) 
0.252*** 
(0.018) 
Loan grade fixed 
effects   √ 
Time fixed effects √ √ √ 
# of observations 29,657 29,657 29,657 
R2 0.0035 0.0043 0.0540 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at month level. Credit controls are 
excluded to check overall performance. 
Table 9. Performance of “crowd” loans (“Crowd” 
loan dummy as key independent variable) 
Outcome Variable CAGR IRR Default  
Post treatment 0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.046*** 
(0.003) 
Crowd loan -0.001 (0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.022*** 
(0.007) 
Crowd loan * post 
treatment 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.012** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
Constant 0.020
*** 
(0.001) 
0.052*** 
(0.001) 
0.194*** 
(0.008) 
Loan grade fixed 
effects   √ 
Time fixed effects √ √ √ 
# of observations 29,657 29,657 29,657 
R2 0.0035 0.0040 0.0539 
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at month level. Credit controls are 
excluded to check overall performance. 
To summarize the overall implications of 
algorithmic lending on investor participation, we 
compare four basic statistics of “flash” loans, middle 
60% loans, and “leftover” loans before and after the 
API upgrade. In Figure 4, the x-axis represents the 
natural log of funding time in seconds and the y-axis 
represents the number of investors. Circle size is 
proportional to the number of funded loans and a 
darker color indicates better loan performance. Arrows 
show the changes triggered by algorithmic trading. 
Loosely speaking, deep-pocket investors are more 
likely to be algorithmic investors, so they can funds 
loans in a faster and smarter way. As a result, they fund 
the majority of “flash” loans and middle 60% loans, 
which typically perform better than “leftover” loans. 
Individual investors are more likely to be manual 
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investors who are crowded out of “flash” and middle 
60% loans by algorithmic investors. Although manual 
investors may still be able to fully allocate their 
money, they can only select from “leftover” loans, 
which harms their investment performance. In a 
nutshell, algorithmic trading creates a new lending 
environment: algorithmic investors are likely to 
achieve high returns at the expense of manual 
investors, who are likely to receive lower (although 
perhaps still acceptable) returns. 
 
 
Figure 4. Pattern change of investor participation (pre 
and post API upgrade) 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Algorithmic trading has great potential to affect 
investor participation in online lending markets, 
although the effect is unclear a priori. Leveraging a 
policy change likely to facilitate algorithmic trading 
(viz., an API upgrade), we identify the impacts of 
algorithmic trading on funding time, lending 
performance, investor concentration, and market size. 
We find that algorithmic trading significantly reduces 
the funding time of loans. As a result, manual investors 
are crowded out of the most quickly-funded and best 
performing loans. However, manual investors are able 
to continue investing in the market, given that 
algorithmic trading appears to increase the market 
size. However, manual investors are restricted to 
“leftover” loans, which normally perform worse than 
other loans. Our findings reveal several promises of 
algorithmic trading, but they also suggest that 
algorithmic trading may exacerbate inequality among 
market participants. Indeed, Prosper.com has launched 
initiatives to make automated trading tools more 
accessible to all investors as well as limiting API 
functionality to reduce the advantages enjoyed by 
institutional investors. We explored the impact of 
these initiatives and found that both appear to “level 
the playing field” (analysis withheld due to the space 
limitations of the HICSS format but available from 
authors). This study contributes to several emerging 
research areas, including online lending, algorithmic 
trading, data-driven decision making, and more 
broadly the economics of artificial intelligence. This 
study also explores means to alleviate the “disparate 
impact” of algorithmic trading on less sophisticated 
investors. 
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